Fenton Fitzwilliam

“The sea is not simply a geographic feature; it is a sphere of political and military struggle.” Admiral Gorshkov’s words, from his 1976 book The Sea Power of the State, feel uncomfortably current for Ireland’s security and economic wellbeing, as well as for Europe more broadly. What happens at sea increasingly echoes in the skies, as Russian naval activity and the now-routine appearance of drones around critical infrastructure across the continent continue to demonstrate.

Yantar, Russia’s intelligence-gathering vessel, is well known in this part of the world. It lingered off Dublin and the Cork coast in 2024, close to vital subsea cables and gas pipelines, before being escorted away. Its recent return, timed around high-profile diplomatic activity in Ireland, was no accident. It was a probe - a test of Ireland’s awareness and resolve, and a reminder of what persistent hybrid pressure looks like in practice. With global energy prices still volatile, any interference with subsea cables could have immediate effects on Irish households and businesses, adding a financial as well as a strategic dimension to these maritime risks.

Across Europe, hybrid pressure on undersea infrastructure has become a defining feature of the strategic landscape. Yantar’s actions, while overt, are not even what most concerns Ireland’s allies. Speaking recently in London, the UK’s First Sea Lord, General Sir Gwyn Jenkins, observed that “the Yantar is only the visible bit… it’s what’s going on under the waves that most concerns me.” Recent cable disruptions and unexplained interference elsewhere in Europe underline that this is not an abstract risk, but a very active one.

Ireland’s vulnerabilities, like those faced by many European states, are not theoretical. Sitting at the Atlantic crossroads, the country hosts a vast proportion of the world’s subsea cables, with roughly three-quarters passing through or near Irish waters. These cables carry billions of Euro in financial transactions, vital communications, and data underpinning Ireland’s tech, financial, and energy sectors. A significant disruption could cost the economy hundreds of millions per week, with ripple effects on employment, investment and public services. Damage to them would not simply mean slower streaming speeds; it could cripple banking systems, disrupt critical infrastructure, expose sensitive data and put lives at risk.

Such pressure has not been confined to the maritime domain. As President Zelensky travelled to Dublin recently, the Naval Service detected rogue drones operating close to his flight path, part of a broader pattern of unlawful and unattributed drone activity now seen regularly across Europe. These incidents, widely assessed by European security services as linked directly or indirectly to Russian state actors, have only intensified in recent months. The threat has taken on added urgency as Ireland prepares to assume the EU Presidency.

The experience of other EU states is instructive. During Denmark’s presidency, counter-drone teams from partner countries were deployed following persistent drone activity assessed as hostile. Ireland has remained cautious in publicly attributing responsibility, but it is telling that the Russian Embassy in Dublin felt compelled to issue denials and equally telling that Taoiseach Micheál Martin publicly dismissed them, even if formal attribution has yet to follow.

The combination of President Zelensky’s visit, Ireland’s impending EU Presidency and the wider deterioration in Europe’s security environment should focus political minds. The government’s planned €15 million investment in counter-drone capabilities is welcome, but modest, given the stakes, particularly for Ireland’s ports, airports and critical infrastructure. Combined with the broader radar programme due later this decade, these initiatives are the cornerstone of Ireland’s principal defence capital priority, but more immediate funding and operational capabilities are needed. These measures form part of a wider commitment to spend up to €1.7 billion on defence equipment and infrastructure by 2030. This is progress, but it must be understood as a foundation, not a finishing line. Ambition without urgency will not keep pace with the threat.

Recent developments must also be understood in the context of Washington’s evolving posture. The latest US National Security Strategy, now being actively implemented, makes clear that American power is increasingly being exercised on Washington’s own terms and in pursuit of narrowly defined national interests. Recent US military action in Venezuela illustrates that even traditional allies are increasingly acting on national priorities first. Europe is no longer America’s primary strategic focus, and Ireland, therefore, cannot assume distant powers will protect its critical infrastructure.

There is an old naval saying that the sea is never neutral. Increasingly, the skies are not either. This moment should serve as a clear call: invest now, protect vital undersea assets and recognise the world as it is, not as we might wish it to be. For Ireland, acting now to safeguard undersea cables, pipelines, and emerging aerial threats is not only a matter of national security but also of economic resilience and reputational credibility in Europe.

By Stewart McDonald, Senior Advisor

Stewart McDonald, previously served as an SNP Member of UK Parliament from 2015 to 2024, holding senior roles including his party's Defence Spokesman and a member of the Foreign Affairs Committee.

Fenton Fitzwilliam advises clients across Ireland and the EU on public affairs, policy and strategic communications, helping organisations cut through complexity, build understanding and deliver results that matter.